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Note
“Don’t Read This If It’s Not for You”:
The Legal Inadequacies of Modern Approaches to
E-mail Privacy
Joshua L. Colburn∗
For many, electronic mail (e-mail) has become an integrated component of daily life. With no postage and the promise
of a virtually instant reply time, it is no wonder that e-mail
volume has increased from 5.1 million messages in 2000 to
135.6 million messages in 2005.1 Unfortunately, many users
cling to a false sense of security associated with e-mail’s widespread acceptance as a legitimate communication medium.2 In
an effort to limit liability and increase privacy, a growing number of e-mailers have incorporated disclaimers into their messages.3
∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2003,
University of Minnesota: Institute of Technology. The author thanks Dean
Joan Howland for her advice and guidance, Lorre and Vicki Colburn for their
loving support, and the outstanding editors and staff of the Minnesota Law
Review. In addition, the author extends special thanks to Mark Karon for his
topic development assistance. Copyright © 2006 by Joshua L. Colburn.
1. Lizzette Alvarez, Got 2 Extra Hours for Your E-mail?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2005, at G1.
2. CHRISTINA CAVANAGH, MANAGING YOUR E-MAIL: THINKING OUTSIDE
THE BOX 46 (2003) (“We have fooled ourselves into regarding our e-mail correspondence as we would a conversation—a surrogate for a more personal exchange like the telephone or face-to-face.”).
3. See CATHERINE SANDERS REACH ET AL., A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES.
CTR., 2006 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY REPORT: WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY TREND REPORT
13 (2006) (reporting that seventy-six percent of firms surveyed “use confidentiality statements as a security precaution”).
For an example of a typical disclaimer, examine the following suggested email footer:
This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and are
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. This communication may contain material protected
by the attorney-client privilege. If you are not the intended recipient
or the person responsible for delivering the e-mail to the intended re-
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A possible explanation for the increasing popularity of email disclaimers may be the recent adoption of e-mail in the legal community.4 As the new millennium approached, lawyers
were still debating the prudence of practicing law over the
Internet.5 When lawyers finally started to use e-mail,6 many
practitioners copied the privilege and confidentiality disclaimers from their letters and faxes into their e-mail messages.7 Because these adapted e-mail disclaimers derive from legal obligations unique to the legal profession,8 the effectiveness of
disclaimers outside the legal profession dissipates.9 Therefore,
contrary to popular belief,10 adding privacy disclaimers to business and personal e-mail messages has no legal effect.11
This Note takes a practical look at the legal foundations of
e-mail disclaimers and argues that, outside the attorney-client
relationship, disclaimers are generally unenforceable and,

cipient, be advised that you have received this e-mail in error and
that any use, dissemination, forwarding, printing, or copying of this email is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error,
please immediately notify _____ by telephone at _____. You will be reimbursed for reasonable costs incurred in notifying us.
MICHAEL R. OVERLY, E-POLICY: HOW TO DEVELOP COMPUTER, E-MAIL, AND
INTERNET GUIDELINES TO PROTECT YOUR COMPANY AND ITS ASSETS 68–69
(1999).
4. See John Christopher Anderson, Transmitting Legal Documents over
the Internet: How to Protect Your Client and Yourself, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2001) (“The use of e-mail and Internet technology in law
firms has exploded over the last ten years.”); Sherry L. Talton, Mapping the
Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail and the Inadvertent Disclosure of
Confidential Information, 20 REV. LITIG. 271, 272 (2000) (“E-mail will replace
paper correspondence and radically alter the practice of law.”).
5. Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort: Careless Internet Habits Can
Open Your Firm to Malpractice, ARK. LAW., Spring 2004, at 25, 25 (noting that
some firms were known to block e-mail usage among their attorneys out of
concern for disclosure of client information).
6. A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., JUNE 2000 TELEPHONE SURVEY: HOW
ATTORNEYS USE E-MAIL, http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/surveys/june2000
.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (finding that ninety-four percent of attorneys
participating in a random phone survey use e-mail in their practices).
7. Krause, supra note 5, at 29.
8. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006) (“A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”).
9. See CAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 47 (“You have no control over your
recipients’ decisions to forward your messages to others without your knowledge or consent.”).
10. See MATT HAIG, E-MAIL ESSENTIALS 76 (2001).
11. See CAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 47.
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therefore, ineffective. Part I of this Note presents a brief background of similar disclaimers in other forms of communication,
including traditional mail and facsimiles. Part II provides a
summary of existing privacy law and explains the limits of its
applicability to e-mail, including the unique role of e-mail privacy disclaimers in the legal profession. Part III examines the
possible extra-legal benefits of including a disclaimer and suggests a few best practices for maximizing effect and enforceability. Part IV describes a proposal to modify current practices
and update existing law in an effort to achieve increased e-mail
privacy. This Note concludes that a majority of the common
provisions of e-mail disclaimers are unenforceable and that email encryption is a viable and substantially more secure alternative.
I. THE DISCLAIMER AS A PRIVACY TOOL
The risks associated with communicating confidential information are apparent in various contexts. An attorney is subject to reprimand or even malpractice liability by exposing confidential or privileged information.12 An employee disclosing
sensitive material may face dismissal or legal action.13 There is
no telling how much embarrassment or scrutiny an individual
might encounter when private communications become public.14
Because communications privacy had been a general concern well before the proliferation of e-mail, e-mailers understandably look to older forms of communication for effective security solutions. With e-mail, however, “it is very easy to click
on the wrong name and send the message to an unintended

12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). See generally Daniel
L. Draisen, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Their Relationship
to Legal Malpractice Actions: A Practical Approach to the Use of the Rules, 21
J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 67 (1997) (explaining that punishments for attorneys range
from private reprimands to complete disbarment).
13. AM. MGMT. ASS’N & EPOLICY INST., 2004 WORKPLACE E-MAIL AND INSTANT MESSAGING SURVEY SUMMARY 6–7 (2004), available at http://www
.epolicyinstitute.com/survey/survey04.pdf (finding that twenty-five percent of
employers surveyed had terminated “an employee for violating e-mail policy”).
14. See Ann Carrns, Those Bawdy E-mails Were Good for a Laugh—Until
the Ax Fell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at A1 (reporting that improper contents
of e-mail messages resulted in the firing of nearly two dozen New York Times
employees).
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person.” Thus, e-mail garners more disclosure anxiety than
traditional forms of communication.15
A. THE FACSIMILE: E-MAIL’S OLDER SIBLING?
With the introduction of the facsimile, the ease of sending
information to the wrong recipient changed from a matter of
writing the wrong address to mistyping a single digit. Because
a cover sheet disclaimer is “virtually all you can do to ensure
that a recipient who gets it incorrectly knows not to read the
fax,”16 lawyers have included disclaimers on facsimiles for quite
some time.17 The insecure practice of receiving faxes in a common area prompted the Minnesota State Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board to issue an opinion in 1999, distinguishing
facsimiles from other, more acceptable, means of communicating confidential client information.18
In order to maximize enforceability, facsimile confidentiality disclaimers generally appear at the beginning of the message.19 In fact, one commentator advises attorneys to “make it a
practice to use a coversheet containing these confidential legends every time they send a fax containing privileged information.”20 While such a coversheet provides notice to all readers,
lawyers are under an additional ethical obligation to return a
missent communication to opposing counsel without examining
it.21 Though this obligation is most commonly associated with
faxes, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct extend this duty to the receipt of any missent

15. OVERLY, supra note 3, at 13.
16. Abdon M. Pallasch, Fax Cover Sheets Carry Dire Warnings for Law
and Lasagna, CHI. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 14, 15.
17. See Tracy Thompson et al., Ethical Issues for Employment Lawyers, in
664 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION COURSE HANDBOOK 859, 876
(2001) (noting the popularity of confidentiality disclaimers on legal fax cover
sheets).
18. See Minn. State Lawyers Prof ’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 cmt. (1999)
[hereinafter Minn. Ethics Op. 19] (“With facsimile machines, the concerns are
less with interception than with unintended dissemination of the communication at its destination, where the communication may be received in a common
area of the workplace or home and may be read by persons other than the intended recipient.”).
19. See Krause, supra note 5, at 29.
20. Anne G. Bruckner-Harvey, Inadvertent Disclosure in the Age of Fax
Machines: Is the Cat Really out of the Bag?, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 385, 397 (1994).
21. See Pallasch, supra note 16, at 15, 73.
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“document.”22 However, it is important to recall that confidentiality concerns extend well beyond the limited realm of lawyerlawyer and lawyer-client communication.23
B. THE ARGUMENT FOR DISCLAIMERS ON E-MAIL MESSAGES
If one considers e-mail just another form of written communication, many of the justifications for fax disclaimers are
readily applicable. In fact, the State Bar of Michigan’s Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics equated e-mail communication to postcards or facsimile transmissions as early as
1996.24 Much like a fax or postcard, “simple e-mail generally is
not ‘sealed’ or secure.”25 Difficulties similar to those posed by
receiving faxes in a common area26 can also arise in a business
environment when curious or disgruntled employees intercept
an e-mail communication discussing sensitive matters such as
a “proposed sale of the business or employee termination issues.”27 With e-mail, this threat also exists outside the office,
where messages may be readily “accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient.”28 Because of this vulnerability, “[e]-mail not only can be, but is intercepted with surprising frequency.”29 By contrast, facsimiles
travel directly over the telephone line from sender to recipient
and leave no intermediate copies behind. Moreover, a fax’s
readability quickly deteriorates across multiple transmissions,
while an e-mail remains clear and legible after retransmission
to an unlimited number of recipients.30 Due to e-mail’s digital
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006) (“A lawyer who
receives a document relating to the representation of a lawyer’s client and
knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent
shall promptly notify the sender.”).
23. See NANCY FLYNN, THE EPOLICY HANDBOOK 3–9 (2001) (arguing that
every organization should have e-mail, Internet, and software policies).
24. See Mich. Comm. on Prof ’l Responsibility & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI276 (1996), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_
opinions/ri-276.htm.
25. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa.
1996), aff ’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
26. See Minn. Ethics Op. 19, supra note 18.
27. See Brett R. Harris, Counseling Clients over the Internet, COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW., Aug. 2001, at 4, 5.
28. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834; accord Anderson, supra note 4, at 4 (“Because e-mail is transmitted over an ‘open network,’ electronic documents
travel through countless interconnected computers on their Internet voyage.”).
29. Anderson, supra note 4, at 7.
30. See OVERLY, supra note 3, at 11–12.
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format, degradation of quality over an enormous number of
forwards is not an issue.31
In addition, the unique properties of e-mail introduce several new concerns, including fresh ways to dispatch a message
to an unintended third party. For example, the relative ease of
“spoofing,” or making a message appear to be from someone
else, creates the possibility that replying to an existing e-mail
can result in disclosure of private information to an unintended
recipient.32 Hitting the reply button is considerably simpler
than typing an incorrect seven- or ten-digit number into a fax
machine. Therefore, a truly effective e-mail disclaimer should
protect against more than the accidental misaddress of a message.
The various practical differences between faxes and e-mail
messages are substantial enough to challenge the sufficiency of
copying a fax disclaimer into an e-mail verbatim.33 Furthermore, while facsimile disclaimers have yet to work their way
into non-legal faxes, business and personal e-mail disclaimers
appear to be quite popular.34 This growth is overzealous, however, as the legal foundation for e-mail privacy disclaimers is
difficult to identify.35
II. SEARCHING FOR A FOUNDATION
Most e-mail disclaimers suggest a level of legal support,
but do not specifically reference any statutes or specific legal
principles.36 In fact, despite the common disclaimer language
31. Id.
32. Harris, supra note 27, at 6–7 (describing the potential for “spoofing”);
see also Anderson, supra note 4, at 14 (“E-mail with a falsified return address
may be used to trick an e-mail recipient into releasing confidential information.”).
33. Compare OVERLY, supra note 3, at 10–12 (describing the characteristics of e-mail), with Pallasch, supra note 16, at 14–15 (discussing facsimile
cover sheet warnings).
34. REACH, supra note 3, at 13 (reporting that seventy-six percent of firms
surveyed “use confidentiality statements as a security precaution”).
35. Claire Smith, Confusion Rules on Disclaimers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2005, 2005 WLNR 20764252 (“The validity of disclaimers is as yet largely untested.”).
36. Consider, for example, this disclaimer suggested to academic advisors
by the University of Maryland Campus Legal Office:
This message and any included attachments are property of the University of Maryland, College Park, and are intended only for the addressee(s). The information contained herein may include trade secrets or privileged or otherwise confidential information.
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that certain actions are “strictly prohibited”37 or “may be
unlawful,”38 courts have yet to address the enforceability of a
privacy disclaimer in the context of electronic mail. Therefore,
this Note addresses the likely legal arguments favoring the
most common provisions of e-mail disclaimers.
A. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA),39 an extension of the Federal Wiretap Statute of
1968,40 provides the best foundation for a claim to e-mail privacy. Congress passed the ECPA in response to a study showing the potential threats that new technologies posed to the
civil liberties of the citizenry.41 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported that while a first class letter was “afforded a high
level of protection against unauthorized opening,” there were
“no comparable . . . statutory standards to protect the privacy
and security of communications transmitted by . . . new forms
of telecommunications and computer technology.”42 Therefore,
the ECPA makes unauthorized interception of e-mail subject to
a $500 fine, not more than five years in prison, or both.43 The
concept of the ECPA was apparently persuasive, as many
states have independently adopted most if not all of its provisions.44
Unauthorized review, forwarding, printing, copying, distributing, or
using such information is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If
you received this message in error, or have reason to believe you are
not authorized to receive it, please promptly delete this message and
notify the sender by e-mail. Thank you.
Univ. of Md. Coll. of Agric. & Natural Res., Email Disclaimers, ADVISOR’S ADVISOR, Jan. 2005, http://www.agnr.umd.edu/AGNRnews/Article.cfm?&ID=
4368&NL=87 [hereinafter Univ. of Md. Coll. of Agric. & Natural Res., Email
Disclaimers] (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., OVERLY, supra note 3, at 69.
38. See, e.g., Traversio, Email Disclaimer, http://www.traversio.com/
traversio/corporate_legal_disclaimer.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Univ. of
Md. Coll. of Agric. & Natural Res., Email Disclaimers, supra note 36.
39. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
40. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 211–25 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2000)); see Harris, supra note 27, at 5.
41. 132 CONG. REC. H4045 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) (acknowledging that the ECPA “grew out of extensive hearings
and an Office of Technology Assessment study”); OVERLY, supra note 3, at 25.
42. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a)–5(b) (2000); OVERLY, supra note 3, at 26.
44. See, e.g., Privacy of Communications Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.01–.41
(2004).
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An important limitation of the ECPA, however, is that it
only applies to the “interception” of electronic communication.45
The statute itself defines “intercept” to be “the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device.”46 Nonetheless, courts have thoroughly discussed
the meaning of interception under the ECPA.
For example, the Eighth Circuit restricted the definition of
interception under the earlier Federal Wiretap Statute to action taken with “bad purpose . . . , without justifiable excuse . . . , stubbornly, obstinately or perversely.”47 Under this
definition, accidental e-mail recipients, who likely possess none
of these attributes, would not qualify as interceptors under the
ECPA. Because the ECPA restricts only the interception of
electronic communications, accidental recipients would be free
to do what they please with the contents of the message without fear of violating the statute.48
Courts have limited the applicability of the ECPA by finding that electronic communications that have reached their
destination are ineligible for interception and, therefore, are
outside the protections of the ECPA.49 In 1998, the Third Circuit affirmed the determination that a person “can disclose or
use with impunity the contents of an electronic communication
unlawfully obtained from electronic storage.”50 The Eleventh
Circuit followed suit in 2003 by agreeing that interception under the ECPA only occurs when a communication is in transit.51
Due to this “contemporaneous interception”52 requirement, the
ECPA apparently does not protect electronic communications
that have reached any destination, let alone those that have
reached the incorrect destination. Because an e-mail must
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (limiting applicability to “any person
who . . . intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any . . . electronic communication”
(emphasis added)).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000).
47. See United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933)).
48. See CAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 47 (describing an e-mail recipient’s
ability to do various things with received e-mail messages).
49. See Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (Del. 1997), aff ’d, 172
F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1998).
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1040 (11th Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 1039.
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reach a destination before a human recipient will read any disclaimer attached to it, the ECPA likely lends no authority to
disclaimers that claim legal power over the actions of a recipient. Furthermore, the ECPA does not protect the copies an email leaves on servers as it travels to its destination,53 copies
which are not themselves traveling.54
In addition to its failings in the realm of delivered e-mail,
the ECPA contains an exception that significantly weakens the
level of protection that it provides to e-mail messages that actually are in transit. Commonly referred to as the “provider exemption,”55 it allows electronic communication service providers to “intercept, disclose, or use” communications sent through
their facilities.56 Therefore, the ECPA explicitly permits Internet service providers, employers, and various other e-mail providers to monitor any e-mail that travels on or through their internal network systems, notwithstanding any attached privacy
disclaimers. Because of the open-network nature of the Internet, e-mail messages commonly travel on a provider’s network
without either originating from or terminating at an address on
that same network.57 Consequently, the ECPA permits providers to peer into mere pass-through e-mail traffic. Thus, the
ECPA, through its limited scope and provider exemption, provides little protection to standard e-mail traffic.
While analogies between postal mail and e-mail are accurate to a point, the ECPA is sorely ill-equipped to fulfill its purpose of placing e-mail on the same protective plane as postal
mail. Unfortunately, the ECPA neglects the fact that the way
modern e-mail systems work is rather similar to storing one’s
postal mail in a giant mailbox at the end of the driveway. The
ECPA not only does not require disclaimers, but it also lends no
substantive support to e-mail privacy disclaimers. Because the

53. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 5–6.
54. See Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1040; Wesley Coll., 974 F. Supp. at 391.
55. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 874.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000) (“It shall not be unlawful under this
chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a
provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used
in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication.”); see also Jon Swartz, Boeing Scandal Highlights E-mail Checks, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2005, at 5B (“Monitoring employee
e-mail is becoming the norm in Corporate America.”). See generally FLYNN,
supra note 23, at 34 (“According to the [ECPA], an employer-provided computer system is the property of the employer.”).
57. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 5–6.
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ECPA neither mentions nor supports e-mail disclaimers, one
must locate a more creative foundation for e-mail privacy.
B. COPYRIGHT
Federal copyright law provides another possible legal basis
for e-mail privacy.58 One commentator suggests that “[t]he instant you finish typing a message, the e-mail is protected under
federal copyright law.”59 He further asserts that registration
and copyright notice are “not necessary” to reserve one’s copyright in a message.60 Under this assessment, copyright appears
to be an e-mail privacy panacea. However, the value of copyright as an e-mail privacy tool is overstated.61
Registration is not, in fact, required to invoke copyright
protection, but it is required to file an infringement suit.62
Therefore, to assert copyright protection as a basis for e-mail
privacy without actually registering is, realistically, an idle
threat. For most e-mailers, it is implausible to consider paying
a thirty dollar copyright registration fee for each private communication.63
Even if a user manages to get past the registration hurdle,
the nature of copyright law itself provides another bar to enforcement. A cause of action for copyright infringement also requires that the infringer actually violate the owner’s copyright
rights.64 This action may include copying the work or distributing it, but simple disclosure of an e-mail’s contents does not appear to qualify as infringement.65 Though copyright appears to

58. See OVERLY, supra note 3, at 47.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Copyright in E-mail, 5 J. ELEC. PUBL. (1999),
http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/05-01/field.html (“Copyright should have no
bearing on the use of messages never intended for public distribution.”).
62. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (2005) (“No action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”).
63. See Marybeth Peters, Analysis and Proposed Copyright Fee Schedule
to Go into Effect July 1, 2002, at 9–10 (2002), http://www.copyright.gov/
reports/fees2002.pdf (noting that increasing copyright registration fees have
been accompanied by diminishing numbers of copyright registrations).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer.”); Field, supra note 61.
65. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (enumerating the rights of a copyright owner).
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be a creative way to fill in a few of the holes in the ECPA, it is
by no means a complete patch.
C. FULFILLING A DUTY
Some e-mail disclaimers are nothing more than a response
to a legal duty to identify certain communications as confidential.66 Because “no cases directly address whether e-mail sent
over the Internet is subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy,”67 senders are arguably prudent to proceed as if there is
no such expectation. Often, the inclusion of an appropriate email disclaimer satisfies certain duties of nondisclosure. For
example, the Internal Revenue Service’s recent revisions to its
Circular 230 require the inclusion of a disclaimer with written
statements about specific federal tax issues.68 Under such circumstances, the inclusion of an e-mail privacy disclaimer is
both necessary and appropriate.69 Ordinary business and personal e-mail messages, however, do not have any such statutory requirements.
Considering the duties of confidentiality imposed on other
industries, the legal community’s concerns over e-mail communication are readily visible. These concerns are likely due to the
legal community’s direct involvement in the issue of confidentiality. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct place a general burden of confidentiality on an
attorney regarding “information relating to representation of a
client,”70 and disclosure may subject a lawyer to malpractice
proceedings or sanctions.71
Much of the discussion of e-mail privacy has surrounded
the maintenance of attorney-client privilege. Because the law
governing waiver of privilege through inadvertent disclosure is
in a “state of flux,” the effectiveness of including a disclaimer
66. A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., supra note 6.
67. Talton, supra note 4, at 271.
68. See Jane Pribek, New Trend: Law Firms Have Their Own ‘In-House’
Counsel, MINN. LAW., Sept. 26, 2005, at S-1, available at 2005 WLNR
15313245.
69. Id.; see also Letter from McNair Law Firm, P.A. to Its Clients, IRS
Circular 230 and Its Impacts, http://www.mcnair.net/230.pdf (explaining its
inclusion of a disclaimer confirming with the requirements of Circular 230)
(last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006) (“A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation.”).
71. See Draisen, supra note 12, at 67.
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very much depends on the law of the applicable jurisdiction.72
For all jurisdictions, a communication must satisfy three criteria in order to be eligible for privilege protection: the client
must have intended it to be confidential, the client’s expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable under the circumstances, and the confidentiality must have been subsequently
maintained.73
There are three categories of attorney-client privilege jurisdiction: strict responsibility, balancing, and no-waiver.74 In a
strict responsibility jurisdiction, the existence of a disclaimer
will do nothing to maintain privilege because disclosure alone
waives the privilege.75 In a balancing jurisdiction, the inclusion
of an attorney-client privilege disclaimer will weigh in favor of
maintaining the privilege in the case of an inadvertent disclosure.76 In a no-waiver jurisdiction, a disclaimer is superfluous
as long as the sender did not intend to waive the privilege.77
While failure to assert attorney-client privilege has resulted in
waiver,78 it is important to note that the inclusion of a disclaimer apparently does no harm in any of the three classes of
jurisdiction.
In 1998, the American Bar Association adopted Resolution
98A119A, urging the courts to afford e-mail communication
“the same expectations of privacy and confidentiality as those
accorded traditional means of communication.”79 A strict interpretation of this classification suggests that the ABA considers
e-mail to be as secure as sending a letter through the postal
service, where disclaimers are rarely used. A year later, the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility built upon Resolution 98A119A in Formal Opinion 99413 by addressing the confidentiality of unencrypted e-mail.80
72. See Talton, supra note 4, at 274.
73. Id. at 288–89.
74. Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 20, at 393.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding
that a lack of evidence that the defendants asserted a claim of attorney-client
privilege with respect to computer material precluded a later assertion of
privilege).
79. Harris, supra note 27, at 10; see also A.B.A., POLICY & PROCEDURES
HANDBOOK 276 (2005–06).
80. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999) [hereinafter Formal Op. 99-413].
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Formal Opinion 99-413 states that “[a] lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . because the mode of
transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint.”81 However, the Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility bases much of its
conclusion on the presumption that the “unauthorized interception or dissemination of the information is a violation of [the
ECPA].”82 As discussed above in Part II.A., courts have held the
ECPA to restrict the dissemination of only intercepted information.83 Nonetheless, the Committee asserts the contrary conclusion that the ECPA somehow bars the disclosure of stored information.84
Despite the Committee’s questionable assumption regarding the scope of the ECPA, Formal Opinion 99-413 prescribes
that “[p]articularly strong protective measures are warranted
to guard against the disclosure of highly sensitive matters.”85 A
disclaimer apparently does not qualify as a “particularly
strong” measure, as the Committee only lists the avoidance of
e-mail altogether as an example.86
The Minnesota State Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board appears to agree with the ABA’s optimistic conclusions
about the security of e-mail communications.87 In a comment to
Opinion 19, the Board states that “[t]his opinion reflects the
prevalent view of other states and technology experts, that
communications by facsimile, e-mail, and digital cordless or cellular phones, like those by mail and conventional corded telephone, generally are considered secure.”88 In the same vein, one
commentator suggests that attorneys “worry too much” about

81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1046 (11th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1983); Wesley Coll. v. Pitts,
974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (Del. 1997), aff ’d, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1998).
84. Compare Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 80 (applying the ECPA to
“dissemination” independent of “interception”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)–(e)
(2000) (addressing “disclosure” of intercepted information).
85. Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 80.
86. Id. (noting that e-mail should be avoided in situations that similarly
“warrant the avoidance of the telephone, fax, and mail”).
87. Minn. Ethics Op. 19, supra note 18.
88. Id.
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Internet security,89 but, much like ABA Opinion 99-413,90 these
aging and naïve conclusions fail to consider the reality of e-mail
insecurity.
Despite this insecurity, an e-mail disclaimer as a claim of
privilege has merit on its own. For example, in United States v.
Neill, the D.C. District Court found that a lack of evidence
demonstrating that the defendant asserted a claim of privilege
with respect to computer files precluded a later assertion of
privilege.91 Under this rule, a disclaimer referencing privilege
may insulate e-mail files from a default waiver of privilege.
Among the various duty-based reasons for ensuring the
privacy of an e-mail, maintaining attorney-client privilege is
clearly of special importance to the legal community. Nonetheless, there is no explicit requirement or recognition of e-mail
privacy disclaimers. In the face of a seemingly ethereal legal
foundation, a prudent e-mail disclaimer user should take advantage of whatever means are available to strengthen the disclaimer’s effect.
III. STRENGTHENING THE BARK
The “bark” of the disclaimer refers to its general effect independent of its legal underpinning. Even without a specific legal foundation,92 disclaimers may arguably serve deterrent
purposes through either the benevolence of others or fear of
retribution.93 As a tool to limit dissemination of private information, any warning should prove effective to a friendly recipient. However, some approaches to disclaimer usage are likely
to be more effective than others.
A. PLACEMENT
The placement of a privacy disclaimer logically has an impact on whether it is read before the recipient can “violate” its
provisions. Nonetheless, most users place disclaimers of all
89.
90.
91.
92.

Anderson, supra note 4, at 7.
Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 80.
United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.D.C. 1997).
See, e.g., STEVEN E. MILLER, CIVILIZING CYBERSPACE: POLICY, POWER,
AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 362 (1996) (“The status of email is still
in a state of legal confusion.”).
93. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE 3 (1995) (“[T]he only security anyone has is based
on the honesty, ignorance, and indifference of those at the intermediate
points.”).
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kinds at the end of their messages.94 This practice brings the
effectiveness of such appended disclaimers into question. “One
cannot unring a bell”; after the content of the e-mail is read, the
damage is done.95
Sensible practice would place the disclaimer at the beginning of the document where readers are more likely to read it
before they read the contents.96 This practice would better conform with the use of similar disclaimers in other forms of communication. For asserting attorney-client privilege, an additional notice could be placed in the subject line indicating that
the message is a privileged communication.97
For maximum effectiveness, a user should place private information into a separate e-mail attachment.98 The body of the
e-mail should contain only the disclaimer. The disclaimer
should also appear at the top of the attached document. Users
of this practice may encounter difficulties if different wordprocessor programs are incompatible. However, a user may easily alleviate this problem through the use of a format that has a
universal reader available, such as the portable document file
(PDF) or rich-text format.
Employing these practices would maximize the likelihood
that the recipient notices and reads the disclaimer, regardless
of whether the disclaimer is enforceable. Prominence and early
placement create the greatest likelihood that an unintended recipient will comply with a disclaimer.
B. AUTOMATION
The practice of placing the disclaimer at the end of the
message99 is logically related to a tendency to simplify the disclaimer’s inclusion. Some law firms even configure their computer systems to automatically place their own disclaimer at

94. Krause, supra note 5, at 28–29.
95. Talton, supra note 4, at 292.
96. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 877; Krause, supra note 5, at
28–29 (comparing e-mail disclaimers which typically appear at the end of the
message to fax disclaimers that typically appear before the message).
97. JONATHAN BICK, 101 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INTERNET
LAW 32 (2000).
98. See Talton, supra note 4, at 304.
99. See, e.g., MONICA SEELEY & GERARD HARGREAVES, MANAGING IN THE
EMAIL OFFICE 119 (2003) (advising organizations and individuals to “[s]et up
your software’s signature feature to add letterhead details and any disclaimer
to your messages automatically”).
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the end of every outgoing e-mail message.100 Though admittedly efficient, this approach may pose the greatest barrier to
disclaimer effectiveness and enforceability.
For commercial e-mail clients101 on the market today, the
only way for an ordinary user to include text automatically in
every message is to use a “signature.” As the name suggests, email clients provide an option to append a signature automatically to the end of a message.102 This practice makes sense if
one considers that software developers originally designed this
feature to communicate a sender’s contact information.103 However, the automated signature feature is wholly inadequate for
disclaimers. Until software designers create a plausible option
to automatically insert text at the beginning of a message, tension will remain between the convenience of automation and
the prudence of effective disclaimer placement.
Authors who are opposed to automation believe that these
types of disclaimers are meaningless to a court if a user includes them on every communication,104 including lunch appointments.105 Over-inclusion, they argue, can only result in a
dilution of the already questionable legal meaning of e-mail
disclaimers.106
The possibility and potential consequences of forgetting a
disclaimer on a single critical e-mail weighs heavily in favor of
using automatic signatures to communicate disclaimers.107
However, the possibility that overuse may indiscriminately invalidate the same disclaimer on all of a user’s e-mail messages
100. Krause, supra note 5, at 29.
101. In this context a “client” is a software program used to interact with a
server, such as an e-mail server. See JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS,
COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN APPROACH FEATURING THE INTERNET
10–11 (2d ed. 2003).
102. See Microsoft Office Assistance, About Signatures in Messages,
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/assistance/HP052427451033.aspx (last visited
Oct. 19, 2006) (defining “e-mail signature” as “text and/or pictures that are
automatically added to the end of an outgoing e-mail message”).
103. Microsoft Office Online, Format E-mail Messages for Clarity,
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/FX011456181033.aspx (last visited Oct. 19,
2006) (suggesting that “the first place [e-mail recipients] look for your contact
information is in the signature line at the end of your message” and that “[e]mail message signatures should display complete contact data, including
name, title, phone numbers, organization, and Web site address”).
104. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 877.
105. See Krause, supra note 5, at 29.
106. Pallasch, supra note 16, at 15.
107. Id.
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is far more devastating and should be sufficient to dissuade the
average user from giving in to the simplistic appeal of automation.108
C. PLAUSIBLE COMPLIANCE
Two considerable issues arise when evaluating the plausibility of a recipient’s compliance with the common provisions of
an e-mail disclaimer. First, the recipient must determine the
identity of the intended recipient.109 Second, if a recipient resolves that he is not the intended recipient, he must delete the
message from his system.110 Because of the informal nature of
e-mail,111 ascertaining the true intention of the sender may be
quite difficult. Clearly, a greeting containing a name other than
the name of the recipient indicates that a message is intended
for someone else. However, a brief message between two wellacquainted parties may not contain any information identifying
the sender other than his e-mail address, let alone an indication of the intended recipient. In order to maximize the effect of
a request to determine the intended recipient, senders should
make the identity of their intended recipients unequivocally
clear in the body of messages.
Realistically, senders have no control over the actions of email recipients after receipt.112 What is worse, even if recipients follow instructions to delete the e-mail, multiple copies of
the e-mail’s contents will likely remain elsewhere on the recipients’ systems.113 Therefore, the expectations associated with a
disclaimer’s request for deletion are also unrealistic in practice.
Through changes in placement and usage, users may be
108. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 877.
109. See Krause, supra note 5, at 28–29 (observing that the text of disclaimers typically claims that “[t]he above e-mail is for the intended recipient
only”).
110. See, e.g., TD Bank Financial Group, Legal Notices and Disclaimers of
Liability, http://www.td.com/legal/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (“If you
receive this communication in error . . . permanently delete the entire communication from any computer, disk drive, or other storage medium.”).
111. OVERLY, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that the incorrectly perceived impermanence of e-mail is one reason people treat it so informally).
112. See id. at 12. (“[Y]ou have no control over whether that person keeps
your message confidential or circulates it to any number of other people—or
posts it on the Internet, where it may be viewed by thousands of people.”).
113. Id. at 11 (“People wrongly believe that if they delete a piece of e-mail
it is gone forever.”); see also A.B.A. DIV. FOR MEDIA RELATIONS & COMMC’N.
SERVS., FACTS ABOUT PRIVACY & CYBERSPACE 13 (1999) (“Deleted e-mail is
often archived on tape and stored for years (deleting does not really delete).”).
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able to bolster the effect of e-mail disclaimers that contain reasonable provisions. However, without some legal support for email privacy, a disclaimer is nothing more than a hollow threat.
While changes to the law are the most straightforward means
of increasing legal support, alternatives exist.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE BITE
The “bite” of an e-mail disclaimer refers to the actual legal
impact of and obstacles to noncompliance. Two categories of email disclaimer bites exist: prevention and punishment. Effective prevention measures are proactive and preclude the unintended recipient from disobeying the provisions of a disclaimer.
In contrast, effective punishment measures are reactive and
provide remedies or disincentives for the disobedient recipient.
A. PREVENTION
Two proactive privacy measures are presently available to
users. First, recent advances in e-mail encryption software
have made encryption a plausible way to maintain privacy at a
reasonably high success rate.114 A second and much less immediate option involves introducing better e-mail standards. If one
of these options is adopted, it is likely that the other will be as
well.
1. Encryption
Because of its effectiveness both in transit and after delivery, encryption is a powerful means of securing e-mail communications.115 Moreover, an encrypted message maintains privacy while requiring compliance on the part of an unintended
recipient.116 Encryption involves scrambling a message before
dispatch117 and transmitting the scrambled message to recipients who have unique keys that allow them to unscramble the
message. In fact, deciphering a message coded by modern encryption without a key can be so difficult that it takes a high-

114. See SEELEY & HARGREAVES, supra note 99, at 201 (“[Encryption software] is a relatively mature, albeit underused, form of email management.”).
115. Talton, supra note 4, at 284.
116. See LILIAN EDWARDS & CHARLOTTE WAELDE, LAW & THE INTERNET:
REGULATING CYBERSPACE 141–47 (1997).
117. BICK, supra note 97, at 32 (explaining that encryption effectively renders a message “unintelligible to all those but the intended recipient”).
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speed computer years of computing to solve.118 In addition to
the added security encryption provides, the extra steps of
scrambling and unscrambling allow for a more formal system of
providing proof of receipt.119
Today’s encryption software employs “public key” cryptography to encode and decode messages.120 To decrypt encrypted
e-mail messages, a user must acquire two keys: a public key
and a private key.121 As the names suggest, users give their
public keys to whomever they want to send encrypted messages
and keep their private keys secret.122 After the public key is
distributed, senders use it to encrypt messages to users, who
decrypt all of the messages with their private keys.123
A popular analogy explains encryption as a system of metal
boxes and padlocks.124 The user distributes metal boxes and
open padlocks (the public keys).125 The user has a special key
(the private key) that opens all of the padlocks.126 Only the user
has the private key, so once the senders lock their padlocks,
only the user can access the contents.127
Upon such a straightforward explanation, one begins to
ponder how something as simple as acquiring a few keys and
giving them to a user’s contacts is an obstacle to the widespread adoption of something so secure. Consider, then, having
to maintain a different key for every e-mail contact. For many
users, that would be one very large, and very confusing, key

118. DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 290 (3d ed. 2000).
119. NANCY FLYNN & RANDOLPH KAHN, E-MAIL RULES 175 (2003).
120. See Tim Greene, Sun, Lucent Tout Encrypted E-mail Service, NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 21, 2005, at 40, 40; COMER, supra note 118, at 288–94
(providing a basic overview of the e-mail encryption process).
121. SCHNEIER, supra note 93, at 24 (explaining that typical encryption
keys are between 40 and 128 bits long, or 13 to 40 decimal digits).
122. Id. at 42.
123. COMER, supra note 118, at 291.
124. See, e.g., Cornell Univ., Primes, Modular Arithmetic, and Public Key
Cryptography
II
(2004),
http://www.math.cornell.edu/~mec/2003-2004/
cryptography/RSA/RSA.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Open2.net, Mathematical
Thinking,
http://www.open2.net/sciencetechnologynature/maths/
primer.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Univ. San Francisco Cal., Public Key
Encryption,
http://www.cs.usfca.edu/~parrt/course/601/lectures/public.keys
.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
125. See Cornell Univ., Primes, Modular Arithmetic, and Public Key Cryptography II, supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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ring.128 Until recently, the costs of managing such key rings
were prohibitive.129
A growing number of software developers have introduced
encryption suites that dramatically reduce the cost and complexity of the encryption process.130 Transparency is crucial, as
even contemplating the actual processes behind encryption can
unnerve a computer scientist, not to mention the average
user.131 With many current products, key management is completely automated and takes place behind the scenes.132 Similarly, developers have also simplified the process of enabling
encryption for a particular e-mail message. For one product,
“[e]nd users wishing to encrypt a message type the trigger word
‘secure’ in the subject line before hitting the send button.”133
Another tool actually “scans the e-mail’s text and attachments
and looks for combinations of words and numbers that look like
it’s going to be [confidential] information.”134 In a 2005 evaluation of available e-mail encryption suites, the University of
Kansas’s manager of Local Area Network Support Services
commented that “[a]ll the products proved to [the evaluators]
that getting started with e-mail encryption is much easier than
[one] might think.”135
Despite these recent advances in the software industry,
electronic communications experts suggest that “[f]ew organizations employ e-mail encryption technology broadly
enough.”136 One commentator goes so far as to direct his read-

128. Rhonda M. Jenkins & Jack Seward, Protecting Your Digital Assets:
Overcoming E-mail Insecurity, http://www.hp.com/sbso/solutions/legal/expert_
insights_protecting_digital_assets.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) (commenting
that it would be “difficult to keep track of the many digital keys necessary to
lock and unlock the volumes of encrypted messages”).
129. See id. (explaining that server-based e-mail solutions offering enterprise-level domain-to-domain encryption between attorney and client locations
are costly and complex to implement).
130. See Travis Berkley, CipherTrust Tops Encryption Field, NETWORK
WORLD, Aug. 15, 2005, at 39, 41. See generally Electronic Privacy Information
Center, EPIC Online Guide to Practical Privacy Tools, http://www.epic.org/
privacy/tools.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (providing a non-exhaustive listing of available e-mail encryption programs).
131. Berkley, supra note 130.
132. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 93, at 44, 208.
133. Paul McNamara, You’ve Got Mail, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 15, 2005, at
36, 38.
134. Id.
135. Berkley, supra note 130, at 45.
136. FLYNN & KAHN, supra note 119, at 174.
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ers to “not use the Internet for communication of confidential
information unless it is encrypted.”137 In his analysis, he states
that “it is generally agreed that a lawyer’s failure to use security technology could be construed as a failure to take reasonable precautions.”138
As far as lawyers are concerned, however, the courts have
yet to find that communication via unencrypted e-mail exhibits
an intention to disclose information to a privilege-destroying
third party.139 In fact, Bar Association committees have found
precisely the opposite. For example, the Illinois State Bar Association and the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee explicitly decided to allow transmission of confidential information by unencrypted electronic mail in 1997 and 1998, respectively.140
Because of the widespread trend toward accepting unsecured e-mail as a secure method of communication, a change in
the disposition of the various bar ethics committees will likely
occur only after a vast majority of the legal community starts to
employ encryption. This change may already be in progress, as
almost one-third of large firms recently reported using encryption to secure client e-mail messages.141 A cautious user,
whether a lawyer or a private individual, should thoroughly
consider using encryption, especially for particularly sensitive
communications.
2. Introducing New E-mail Standards
The introduction of e-mail standards is a potential alternative to using encryption as a preventative measure. For example, many companies are adopting a “‘bright-line’ no-forwarding
policy” in order to avoid the complications of dealing with unauthorized forwarding.142 Such a policy reduces liability and
provides a sense of security to those who send e-mail to persons
137. BICK, supra note 97, at 32.
138. Id. at 31.
139. Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 871–72 (citing Mitchell v. Towne,
87 P.2d 908 (1939)).
140. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/attorney_resources/opinions (discussing ethical implications of using encryption and stating that encryption is not ethically mandated); Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 96-10 (1997), available at http://www
.illinoisbar.org/CourtsBull/EthicsOpinions (discussing electronic communication, the use of encryption, and ethical implications); see also Ohio Bd. of
Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline, Op. 99-2 (1999).
141. See REACH ET AL., supra note 3, at 13.
142. See OVERLY, supra note 3, at 17.
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within the organization. Other e-policy experts advocate a
sweeping requirement of obtaining the original sender’s permission before forwarding an e-mail.143 This approach holds the
additional advantage of curbing unauthorized forwarding without eliminating forwards entirely. Alternatively, a universal
shift from placing disclaimers at the end of a message to placing them at the top may improve efficacy.
B. PUNISHMENT
While the sender can easily apply most prevention measures himself or herself, punishment options are more cumbersome to implement. Unfortunately, Congress appears unlikely
to implement most proposed Internet legislation.144 Despite
this record, claims that existing law is sufficient underestimate
the limitations of the ECPA and other allegedly applicable
statutes.
Much of the existing policy regarding e-mail security assumes that “intercepting an electronic mail message is illegal
under the ECPA.”145 However, the threat of interception is
much less troublesome compared to the threats of dissemination to unintended third parties through disclosure or unauthorized forwarding by a recipient.146
In enacting the ECPA, the Senate Judiciary committee exhibited intent to prevent unauthorized opening of e-mail analogous to the protections afforded to first class postal mail.147 The
law protects first class mail from unauthorized opening until it
reaches the directed recipient, even while it sits in the mailbox
after delivery.148 Yet, through its express limited application to
143. FLYNN, supra note 23, at 92 (“A confidential email message intended
for a single reader could have a negative impact on the original sender if forwarded to additional, unintended readers.”).
144. BICK, supra note 97, at 101.
145. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 140.
146. Claire A. Simmers & Adam Bosnian, Reducing Legal, Financial and
Operational Risks: A Comparative Discussion of Aligning Internet Usage with
Business Priorities Through Internet Policy Management, in MANAGING WEB
USAGE IN THE WORKPLACE 270, 279 (Murugan Anandarajan & Claire Simmers
eds., 2002) (discussing Twentieth Century Fox’s perception that “one keystroke could result in the loss of a confidential movie/TV script or contract detail”).
147. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
148. United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
ECPA prohibits a person from taking a letter before it has been delivered to
the person to whom it has been directed, even when the address may be outdated or incorrect).
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communications interception, the ECPA does not afford this
presumed protection to e-mail messages149 and therefore fails
to fulfill congressional intent to place e-mail on the same privacy footing as first class mail.
Though requiring the original sender’s permission to disseminate an electronic message would eliminate the threat of
unauthorized forwarding, such a provision would fall outside
the original intent of the ECPA and would require new justification.150 In fact, postal mail forwards are presently subject to
the same laws as e-mail forwards. The only difference is that email forwards are not subject to the physical limitations that
accompany the copying of a letter, and therefore they require
additional limitations to achieve the same effect. Though
unlikely,151 either a change in e-mail industry standards or a
congressional amendment of the ECPA to ban unauthorized
forwarding would achieve this effect.
In order to realistically extend to e-mail the same level of
protection as first class mail regarding delivery to the correct
recipient, e-mail addresses and recipient names would both
need to be required separately, much like how both an address
and the name of a recipient are required on an envelope. Such a
separation would greatly clarify the intent of the sender152 and
would enable compliance with currently ineffective disclaimer
provisions. When combined with a statutory extension of firstclass mail protections to e-mail, the security of e-mail messages
would be greatly increased.
CONCLUSION
The initial tepid response of the legal profession to client
communication over e-mail is understandable. Despite a lack of
advancements in the security of standard e-mail, the legal profession has nonetheless embraced e-mail as an acceptable
means of communication. With the lawyers came the confidentiality disclaimers, which are presently toothless outside the attorney-client privilege context. A more personal “please don’t
copy or forward this” statement likely better serves most nonlawyers.

149.
150.
151.
152.

See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
See id.
BICK, supra note 97, at 101.
See Krause, supra note 5, at 28–29.
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In addition, the means of use of e-mail disclaimers has
been more a creature of convenience than of functionality. The
limitations of existing technology have sacrificed effectiveness.
Unless Congress takes new steps to increase the effectiveness
and enforceability of modern e-mail disclaimers, encryption is a
reasonable and substantially more effective alternative privacy
tool.
The proposals outlined in this Note are sensible and practical extensions of existing law and policy that will better align
practice with perception. Congress can additionally secure email through just a few slight changes in policy, without substantial deviation from the spirit of the ECPA. Not only will the
lessened threat of unauthorized e-mail dissemination expand
the marketplace of ideas, but existing disclaimers will also become more effective as the intended recipient becomes more
evident.

